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This study explores the institutional implications of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) as a technological 
innovation. As an alternative to rail-based mass transit systems, bus rapid transit has emerged as 
an adaptable and cost-effective means of providing high quality urban mobility. Since its 
development in Curitiba, Brazil in 1974, over 140 cities have since gone on to implement BRT. 
While the technological features of BRT are well understood, the role of various stakeholders, 
institutions, and planning processes is often underemphasized, despite holding the key to 
successful implementation. By focusing on the experience of Bogota, Colombia and 
Johannesburg, South Africa in incorporating existing transportation service providers into new 
BRT systems, this study explores the institutional implications of innovation and the embedding 
of new planning practices into local contexts. By addressing these questions, I hope to shed light 
on the processes of innovation and diffusion, so that planners, policy makers, and other 
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Cities strive to innovate. As population centers and economic hubs, cities constantly evolve, 
and are in a perpetual state of development and adaptation. Whether to stimulate economic 
growth, overcome limited public resources, or address new and emerging policy challenges, 
planners and policy makers increasingly seek new and innovative ways to address urban 
planning needs. The transportation sector – constantly in motion by definition – is a fertile 
proving ground for innovative technologies, policies, and planning techniques. Given growing 
populations, congestion, air pollution, limited public finances, and inequitable access to mobility, 
amongst other planning problems, cities around the world face critical transportation investment 
needs. In many North America cities, transportation infrastructure is often in a state of disrepair, 
while local, regional and state governments are financially constrained and limited in their ability 
to invest in new services. Throughout much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, urban 
population growth is staggering, and governments struggle to provide sufficient infrastructure 
and services for their burgeoning populations. Sustained economic development requires an 
effective urban transportation system to maintain growth, without which cities face exacerbated 
congestion, pollution, and other negative externalities from increased motorization and 
automobile ownership rates. 
As an alternative to rail-based mass transit systems (MRT), bus rapid transit (BRT) has 
emerged as an adaptable and cost-effective means of providing high quality urban mobility. BRT 
has been a particularly popular transportation innovation in developing cities, where the 
technology’s relatively low cost and simplified infrastructure requirements enable a quick and 
flexible implementation schedule. Yet while BRT technology is well understood, the role of 
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actors, institutions, and planning processes is often underemphasized, despite holding the key to 
successful implementation. Using the emergence and diffusion of bus rapid transit technology as 
a research context, this study explores the institutional implications of innovation and the 
embedding of new planning practices into local contexts, focusing on the specific experiences of 
Bogota, Colombia and Johannesburg, South Africa in incorporating existing transportation 
service providers into new BRT system management. Understanding this process is of critical 
importance to urban planners and policy makers facing the complex planning and decision-
making processes of the 21st century, and can also aid the growing number of non-governmental, 
multilateral, and private-sector stakeholders in improving the services they offer to cities. Thus, 
by addressing these questions, I hope to shed light on the processes of innovation and diffusion, 
so that planners, policy makers, and other stakeholders can be better informed when 
implementing new technologies such as bus rapid transit. 
Background 
Defining BRT 
Bus rapid transit refers to “a flexible, rubber-tired rapid transit mode that combines stations, 
vehicles, services, running ways, and Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) elements into an 
integrated system with a strong positive identity that evokes a unique message” (Levinson et al, 
2003, p. 12). By combining these elements, BRT provides a cost-effective means of providing 
fast, efficient, convenient, and comfortable urban mobility. The most successful BRT systems 
achieve travel speeds, service capacity, and passenger throughput levels comparable to rail-based 
mass transit services at a fraction of the cost, using roadway infrastructure and bus-based vehicle 
platforms.  
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While specific BRT characteristics vary from one city to another, BRT systems generally 
include the following elements, which when combined provide a level of service comparable to 
rail-based systems: 
1. Physical infrastructure including exclusive bus lanes or bus-only roadways, an 
extensive network of routes and corridors, enclosed stations with prepaid boarding areas, 
a level station-platform-to-vehicle-floor design, and multi-door buses for rapid boarding 
and disembarkation; 
2. Operational features including frequent bus headways (e.g. waiting time between buses) 
and rapid operating speeds, limited stop services, ample passenger capacity, fare 
integration between routes, modes, and feeder services, and coordinated land use 
planning; 
3. Technological features such as automated fare collection and verification, signal 
prioritization and/or grade separation at intersections to minimize bus stoppage at 
intersections, centralized tracking and system management using GPS and Intelligent 
Transportation System applications, and efficient, low-emission vehicles; 
4. Business and regulatory features such as roadway access restrictions to authorized bus 
operators (e.g. enforced exclusivity of bus lanes) and independent quality control 
oversight; and 
5. Marketing features such as unique and distinctive branding for BRT stations and service 
vehicles, excellence in customer service and operational performance, and ease of 
transfer between the BRT system and other transportation options (Wright & Hook, 2007, 
pp. 11-12). 
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Though such features are neither exhaustive nor absolute requirements, they represent “best 
practices” in system design, which urban transportation experts generally agree provide the ideal 
combination for effective bus rapid transit service. 
Development of BRT 
Bus rapid transit was first implemented in Curitiba, Brazil in 1974. During the 1970s, 
Curitiba experienced tremendous population growth – faster than any other Brazilian city – at 4 
percent annual growth, placing a strain on the city’s transportation infrastructure (Cervero, 1998, 
p. 266). Earlier planning efforts, most notably the 1943 Agache Plan, called for the creation of 
imposing boulevards, with major thoroughfares widened to 60 meters, and a hub-and-spoke 
roadway system premised on near universal automobile ownership (Cervero, 1998, p. 268). Due 
to financial constraints, the city was never able to implement the Agache Plan, and replaced the 
concept of a hub-and-spoke roadway network with a corridor-based development scheme under 
the 1965 Curitiba Master Plan. 
The 1965 Master Plan incorporated several elements that laid the foundation for the 
development of bus rapid transit. In particular, the 1965 Plan was premised on the “notion that 
Curitiba would meet the mobility needs of people rather than automobiles” (Cervero, 1998, p. 
269). To do this, the plan called for the concentration of growth along five radial corridors, with 
a ‘trinary’ axis road system on the rights-of-way set aside in the 1943 Agache Plan (Demery, 
2004, p. 7). As Cervero explains, the trinary road concept (sistema trinario) was built around two 
central restricted lanes dedicated to buses, and supported by a series of auxiliary roads: 
The central busway is flanked by two one-way roads that function as auxiliary lanes, 
providing direct access to buildings fronting the busway. Running parallel to the central 
axis, a block away, are high-capacity one-way streets heading in opposite directions: one 
for traffic flowing to, the other for traffic flowing from, the central city (1996, p. 272). 
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In addition, the 1965 Plan closed Curitiba’s downtown and historic core to traffic, creating a 
pedestrianized hub in the center of the city. Furthermore, land-use objectives such as 
preservation of the historic downtown and the development of mixed-use districts along 
designated linear axes drove transportation policy decisions (Cervero, 1998, p. 270). As Cervero 
notes, “the goal of creating a linear city spawned the guiding principal that urban development, 
mass transit services, and hierarchical road networks must be closely integrated and 
harmoniously planned. The primary tool for creating structural axes would be exclusive busways” 
(1998, p. 269). Linking land use to transportation, the plan encouraged density along the trinary 
network by limited high-rise buildings to a four-block strip on either side of the busway arterials 
(Demery, 2004, p. 7). The results have been noticeable, and certainly contributed to the success 
of Curitiba’s bus-based transit system: “between 1970 and 1978, Curitiba’s overall population 
increased by 73 percent but along the five axes, it increased by 120 percent. By 1992, almost 40 
percent of Curitiba’s population resided within 3 blocks of the major transit arteries” (Demery, 
2004, p. 8). 
Thus, the trinary system became the centerpiece of Curitiba’s bus rapid transit system. 
The city’s highly integrated bus network includes “high-speed buses operating on dedicated 
busways, limited-stop high-speed buses paralleling busways along one-way couplets, orbital 
routes that interconnect the busways, and more than 100 feeder lines that run between the low-
density neighborhoods and trunkline services” (Cervero, 1998, p. 267). System implementation 
began in 1971 with the election of Jaime Lerner as mayor. Lerner was committed to 
implementing the 1964 Master Plan, and exercised bold leadership in urban planning. As 
Cervero notes, “to gain credibility and establish momentum, Lerner’s philosophy was to do 
things simply and quickly, which meant at low cost” (1996, p. 271). As mentioned above, Lerner 
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began by pedestrianizing the historic city center and developing the trinary road system. Within 
three years of Lerner’s election, Curitiba opened 20 kilometers of exclusive bus lanes (Cervero, 
1996, p. 276). Initially, several private bus operators served Curitiba, in a loose yet competitive 
confederation, which eventually led to congestion along the trinary system and a “confluence of 
buses in the city center choking downtown streets” (Cervero, 1996, p. 276). 
This congestion prompted the establishment of an Integrated Transit Network (ITN) in 
1979, combining feeder, express, and inter-district routes. ITN was modeled on a trunk and 
branch system, whereby “buses operating along exclusive lanes in the center of the trinary 
system formed the system’s backbone. Concentric bus loops connected lower-density sections of 
the city to the trunk lines at transfer points (Cervero, 1996, p. 278). While the ITN system proved 
popular, ridership growth through the late 1970s and early 19890s eventually led to capacity 
constraints and delays, jeopardizing the operational efficiency of the system, and leading to 
subsequent innovations in what are now considered design standards of bus rapid transit. To ease 
crowding, Curitiba deployed articulated buses in the mid-1980s; in addition, transportation 
planners modified the trinary bus system with raised bus stations, allowing rapid boarding and 
disembarkation, and launched express bus service connecting transfer stations and running along 
the one way couplets paralleling exclusive bus way trunk lines (Cervero, 1996, p. 279).  Express 
service combined with raised station platforms allowed these buses to carry 3.2 times the 
passengers per hour as standard bus service (Cervero, 1996, p. 279). Overall, the system carried 
nearly 10,000 passengers per lane per hour, approaching the efficiency of many rail-based metro 
systems that Curitiba could otherwise not afford to implement (Cervero, 1996, p. 279). 
Curitiba’s Integrated Transit Network is operated by ten private companies, though buses 
are uniformly branded, and a single fare and payment system provides seamless integration and 
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nearly system-wide access. Two municipal agencies share responsibility for ITN: the IPPUC is 
responsible for long-range planning, while URBS manages day-to-day operations, and is 
responsible for “setting timetables and performance standards; negotiating contracts with private 
bus companies; monitoring private operations for compliance with service standards; planning 
new routes and services; collecting and distributing revenues; and maintaining transfer stations” 
(Cervero, 1996, pp. 289-290). Contracts are structured such that bus operators are paid by the 
kilometer travelled rather than the number of passengers carried, ensuring that routes and 
services are fully deployed, and limiting direct competition over passengers between bus 
operators.  Operators also receive payment for 1 percent of capital expenditures on buses, 
providing “a financial incentive to renovate their rolling stock” (Cervero, 1996, p. 290). 
Combined, these innovative components and institutional arrangements have yielded a high 
quality bus-based transportation system, which has since formed the basis of bus rapid transit as 
an integrated approach to urban mass transit service delivery. In Curitiba, the results were 
striking: during ITN’s first twenty years of service, “system-wide ridership grew by an average 
annual rate of 15 percent, three to four times faster than population growth [while] transit’s share 
of commute trips rose from 8 percent to more than 70 percent” (Cervero, 1996, p. 291). 
Through an incremental process, responding over time to the city’s evolving 
transportation priorities and constraints, Curitiba developed its bus-based transportation system 
into what is now understood as bus rapid transit. Since then, planners and policy makers looking 
to implement BRT have sought lessons from Curitiba and other cities that have adopted BRT, 
while a supporting industry of transportation consultants, equipment manufacturers, activists, 
researchers, international organizations and NGOs – such as the Institute for Transportation and 
Development Policy and the World Resources Institute’s EMBARQ Center for Sustainable 
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Transport – has entered the fray of BRT development, advocacy, and implementation. Thus, 
following Curitiba’s experience with ITN, dozens of cities have developed BRT systems – 
initially in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America, though now BRT can be found in cities 
around the world. According to EMBARQ and ALC-BRT’s Global BRT Database (2012), 143 
cities currently operate bus rapid transit systems, totaling 3,748 kilometers, and carrying over 21 
million passengers per day (see Appendix 1 for a list of BRT cities). While BRT grew gradually 
in during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, it has proliferated in the 21st century (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: BRT Systems in Operation 
 
Source: EMBARQ & Across Latitudes and Cultures – Bus Rapid Transit (ALC-BRT). (2012). 
Global BRT Data. Retrieved from http://brtdata.org 
Benefits of BRT 
Cities around the world have realized significant benefits from implementing bus rapid 
transit. By utilizing existing roadway infrastructure and avoiding the need to lay track or 
construct elevated or underground rights-of-way, BRT systems typically cost 4-to-20 times less 
























W. eds., 2007, p. 11). The Victoria Transport Policy Institute estimates that per-kilometer 
construction costs for BRT range from $1-20 million, compared to $15-25 million for light rail 
systems and $50-200 million for subway systems (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2011). 
Due to its relatively low infrastructure costs and simplified design and construction 
requirements, BRT systems can be implemented more rapidly than rail-based alternatives, within 
1-3 years of conceptualization (Wright, L. & Hook, W. eds., 2007, p. 2). Similarly, because BRT 
systems utilize existing road-based infrastructure, they are more flexible and adaptable than rail 
systems, allowing for more cost-effective adaptation to changing city conditions (Wright, L. & 
Hook, W. eds., 2007, p. 2). 
To be most effective, a transit system such as BRT must be well integrated into the urban 
environment. A public transit system’s effectiveness is “a function of many factors, including 
overall travel speed, frequency of service, directness and ease of transfers, fare policy, access and 
egress conditions to and from stations or stops, and passenger security and comfort” (Asian 
Development Bank, 2010, p. 31). While rail-based mass rapid transit systems often provide high 
speed, high capacity, and direct service by operating on underground or elevated track, building 
such systems can entail significant capital cost, and a timely construction process. Conversely, 
“well-designed BRT systems often provide more direct one-seat rides and can match MRT 
systems for other elements at a far lower cost if given priority access to surface street space” 
(Asian Development Bank, 2010, p. 31). 
 Amongst travel modes, BRT also offers some of the greatest passenger throughput 
potential on a person-per-hour comparison over a 3.5-meter lane equivalent of urban roadway. 
As Figure 2 indicates, a single 3.5-meter BRT corridor can move 43,000 people per hour. While 
lower than suburban and subway rail equivalents, this provides far greater capacity then mixed 
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traffic, or non-BRT bus and light rail alternatives (Hickman, R. et al., 2011, p. 55). From a 
capital expenditure perspective, bus rapid transit systems are a very favorable public 
transportation investment option, offering some of the greatest hourly passenger throughput per 
dollar of capital expense. For example, every $1 million investment in high capacity BRT has the 
potential to move 5,000 people per hour. While walking and footpaths have far greater capital 
cost efficiency, with the potential to accommodate 20,000 to 24,000 people per hour per $1 
million in capital expenditures, comparable public transit investments to BRT offer far less bang 
for the buck. Underground metros provide an hourly capacity of 1,000 people per $1 million 
invested, while elevated rail lines provide an hourly capacity of 625 people per $1 million 
invested. For developing cities in particular, where public expenditures and construction 
management expertise may be limited, and where effective urban transport solutions are needed 
as quickly as possible, bus rapid transit represents a very favorable investment option. 
Figure 2: Corridor Capacity, by Mode (people per hour on 3.5m lane) 
 
Source: Hickman, R. et al (2011) 
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Environmentally, BRT also offers tremendous potential benefit over alternative travel 
modes and public transport investment options. On a CO2 emissions basis, a diesel-powered 
articulated BRT bus offers the best passenger-kilometer performance per ton of CO2 emitted 
compared to other motorized urban travel modes, with an efficiency of 146,000 passenger-
kilometers per ton of CO2 emitted (see Figure 3; Hickman, R. et al., 2011, p. 55). Of course, 
these efficiency comparisons are approximate, and are based on 100% vehicle occupancy. Actual 
performance will vary by load factor, road conditions, traffic flow, travel speed, and vehicle 
technology. If powered with alternative fuels, such as compressed natural gas, bio-diesel, or 
hybrid-electric engine technologies, BRT systems can obtain potentially higher passenger 
mobility efficiency. From a capacity standpoint, performance comparisons between a full BRT 
bus and a single- or double-occupancy passenger vehicle (as opposed to full-occupancy 
passenger vehicle) are even less favorable.  
Figure 3: Transport CO2 Emissions – Passenger-Kilometers per Ton of CO2, by Mode 
 



































Including construction-related emissions, BRT once again represents one of the most 
energy efficient and carbon saving investment options for improving urban transportation. When 
life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions from building and operating BRT systems are factored in, 
the Asian Development Bank’s BRT investments typically reduce CO2 emissions by 2,500 tons 
per kilometer per lane per year when replacing dirtier modes of transport. By contrast, only 
commuter rail projects generate greater CO2 savings, at over 3,000 tons per kilometer per lane 
per year, while expressway projects add nearly 500 tons of CO2 per kilometer per lane per year 
(Asian Development Bank, 2010, p. 14). In part, this is because BRT systems are less carbon 
intensive to build than rail-based mass rapid transit systems, which require greater quantities of 
steel and concrete and greater use of heavy-duty construction equipment to excavate 
underground tunnels or build elevated rights of way (Asian Development Bank, 2010, p. 19). 
Regardless, CO2 emissions reductions are entirely a function of the extent of modal shifting and 
system ridership, and the efficiency of new system design and operations. Achieving these 
savings requires effective planning and integration with the broader transportation network and 
urban context. Poorly designed or underutilized systems may actually contribute to a city’s 
emissions profile. According to a 2010 Asian Development Bank report, BRT systems have a 
high potential to induce modal shift, improve traffic management, and reduce transportation-
related CO2 emissions, but “need good walking and bicycling access if they are to succeed in 
supporting transit-oriented development” (Asian Development Bank, 2010, p. 33). 
These benefits help to explain the widespread adaptation of bus rapid transit systems, and 
have helped to establish BRT as a significant transportation innovation. Yet, while the 
technology to achieve these benefits is well understood, successful implementation often hinges 
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on the actors, institutions, and policies related to BRT planning. The following section will 
address technological innovation, and the political and institutional forces that influence it. 
Understanding Technological Innovation 
The emergence and spread of bus rapid transit must be framed within the context of 
technological innovation. As an integrated system incorporating the infrastructural qualities, 
technological features, and operational practices discussed above, BRT represents a form of 
technology itself, combining Srinivas & Sutz’s definition of technologies as “artifacts, machines, 
organization, skills and techniques” (2008, p. 130) with Dosi’s definition of technology as a set 
of practical and theoretical pieces of “knowledge, know-how, methods, procedures, experience 
of successes and failures and also, of course, physical devices and equipment” (1982, p. 152). 
Following this definition, BRT emerged as a technological innovation through the consolidation 
of various new and existing technical features, and the dissemination of knowledge relating to 
physical and operational design by engineers, planners, and policy makers in cities around the 
world. 
Several frameworks help to explain BRT-related technological innovation. Srinivas & 
Sutz (2008) provide a particularly useful starting point in their discussion of innovation in 
developing countries. Though they focus on economic development through industrialization, a 
comparison can be drawn to the developmental contributions of urban transportation innovations.  
An efficient transportation system is an important component of a productive urban economy, 
serving as a factor input of production in both the circulation of goods and in the mobility of 
labor (Harvey, 1985). Thus, Srinivas and Sutz’s definition of development through 
industrialization as the “engagement of people with technologies and embedded in larger 
production systems” (2008, p. 130) can be extended to bus rapid transit. Within the broader 
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urban context, BRT can support development by improving the overall efficiency of urban 
mobility, and the productive processes that rely on the transportation system, from consumers 
travelling to markets, workers travelling to factories and offices, or manufacturers shipping 
goods.  
Continuing with Srinivas and Sutz, BRT adaptation closely matches their theory of 
scarcity-induced innovation, stemming from developmental processes embedded in scarcities 
that are uncommon in industrialized countries, leading to the incorporation and production of 
different technologies.  These scarcities include 
Problems at the level of infrastructure that is missing or is not up to date, of access to 
materials and equipment of the required quality or accuracy, of institutional support for 
the building of endogenous capacities, of enough people with appropriate skills to run 
projects or discuss ideas, and of money to rely on well-known solutions (1998, p. 130). 
“Idiosyncratic solutions” are a potential outcome from this form of scarcity, addressing problems 
for which solutions have been found in advanced industrial countries, but for which solutions 
applicable to developing counties either do not exist, or are not suitable to be transferred. This 
context provides “a potential opportunity to build technological capabilities and innovate in truly 
substantive ways” (p. 137), which can certainly be said for bus rapid transit. This is not to 
suggest that BRT is a transportation solution restricted to developing country contexts, as indeed, 
many cities in developed countries have implemented and continue to implement BRT. The key 
point, however, is that BRT as a technological innovation first emerged and subsequently spread 
as a response to scarcity in a developing country context of insufficient financial capital to 
implement rail-based metro systems and institutional and organizational struggles to manage 
congestion. The fact that cities in advanced industrial countries have adopted the technology 
simply reinforces the assertion that BRT represents a “substantive innovation.” 
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Building on this discussion, Dosi (1989) provides a number of important insights into the 
institutional implications of bus rapid transit as a technological innovation. In his discussion of 
technology, Dosi cites two contrasting theories of innovation: “demand-pull”, where market 
signals are the main driver of technological change; and “technology-push”, where technology is 
understood as an autonomous or semi-autonomous factor, at least in the short run (1989, p. 148). 
Though actual innovation is usually a mix of both, the distinction highlights the role of “market 
signals in directing innovative activity and technological change” (Dosi, 1989, p. 148). Arguably, 
market failures – such as externalities and imperfect competition – could also fall under the 
“demand-pull” paradigm, serving as a market signal that prompts innovation. For example, firms 
might innovate to develop a new product or process and break the hold of another firm with 
monopoly power in a given market. Similarly, firms might innovate to reduce pollution in the 
most cost effective way as a response to environmental regulation.  Understood this way, BRT 
innovations are better explained by the “demand-pull” theory, at least to the extent that growing 
urban populations, increasing congestion and air pollution, and rising consumer demand for 
improved mobility signal the need for innovative transportation solutions. 
According to Dosi, technological innovation supports economic development by 
expanding the production possibilities function outward for a given set of factors, improving 
factor productivity either quantitatively or qualitatively, and increasing the number of producible 
goods (1989, p. 151). Following this logic, a region’s transportation technology can be seen as 
the set of modes, systems, and options available to residents at various budget constraints to 
fulfill their mobility needs and support the broader economic activity of residents, firms, workers, 
and so on. The goal of a technological innovation in the transportation sector would then be to 
expand the number of choices and/or reduce costs in a way that shifts the production possibility 
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function, or perhaps “mobility possibility function”, outwards. Given congestion, safety concerns, 
and the environmental impacts of transportation, innovative transportation technologies should 
also seek to improve efficiency, reduce environmental externalities, and enhance safety. 
Finally, Dosi describes technological innovations as “incremental” versus “radical”, 
depending on the connection they have to an existing technological paradigm (1989, p. 158). 
Similar to David’s notion of path dependence (2001), a technological paradigm is defined as a 
specific set of technologies that present solutions to problems to the exclusion of other notionally 
possible technologies. Within a technological paradigm, the technological trajectory represents 
the pattern and sequence of problem solving using the same base technology (Dosi, 1989, pp. 
152-153). Incremental innovations continue the technological trajectory within a technological 
paradigm, while radical innovations introduce new technological paradigms. BRT represents a 
slightly more complicated case. While it is primarily an “incremental” innovation in improving 
upon existing vehicle and roadway technologies, it is a radical innovation in that it has set a new 
paradigm for urban transportation through the bundling of vehicle technology, road infrastructure, 
urban design, and operating procedures.  
 
Institutional Challenges Related to Innovation 
While technological innovations often provide important economic development benefits, 
they can also face significant institutional challenges. Most notably, this is through the 
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” process, whereby new technologies and the firms that 
harness them replace less innovative firms that rely on outdated technology. According to Dosi, 
the degree of creative destruction is mediated by the market mechanism: 
Markets perform as a system of rewards and penalizations, thus checking and selecting 
amongst different alternatives… The […] multiplicity of risk-taking actors […] is crucial 
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to the trial-and-error procedures associated with the search for new technological paths 
(1989, p. 156). 
 
Commercially viable innovations emerge by successfully responding to “demand pull” signals 
and gaining market share. In opening up new markets and potentially obtaining monopoly rents, 
innovative, risk-taking firms may secure high rewards, though failure is also a distinct possibility. 
Indeed, this uncertainty is a central function of the market mechanism, and part of the logic by 
which the market supports a dynamic, productive economy. 
Based on market forces alone, the creative destruction process is not explicitly 
problematic. The risk of firm failure, or of being overtaken by a more technologically advanced 
competitor, is an institutionalized norm within market economies; these are the rules of the game. 
This is where bus rapid transit, as a technological innovation, diverges from orthodox economic 
theory. Public transportation systems are often run as monopolies to provide a comprehensive 
service network for customers, maximize the efficiency of operations, and achieve economies of 
scale. When in control of a natural monopoly, the state may find itself in a position to dictate the 
nature and process of technological innovation. Because innovation in this context is state-led, 
rather than market-led, it is less subject to market risk, and the “trial and error” procedures that 
apply to firms in a market system and that regulate the creative destruction process. In part, this 
can lead to poor technology choices. But more importantly for the discussion of institutions, 
state-led innovation can essentially eliminate pre-existing markets and the profitability of pre-
existing firms. In opting to implement BRT, planners and policy makers are choosing a specific 
technology over both potential and pre-existing alternatives. By disrupting and potentially 
eliminating pre-existing markets, governments can introduce significant conflict and generate 
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substantial backlash, despite the potential benefits and improvements provided by bus rapid 
transit.  
More specifically, BRT implementation can adversely impact a number of stakeholders, 
including private transit operators, taxi drivers and owners, truck drivers and delivery companies, 
private automobile owners and users, pedestrians and cyclists, businesses and property owners 
along BRT corridors, environmental and civic organizations, and traffic police (Wright & Hook, 
2007, p. 3). By dedicating travel lanes for the exclusive use of buses and converting lanes, 
medians, or sidewalk space for stations, BRT systems can reduce available parking, decrease 
available street space for other transportation modes, eliminate open space, and disrupt delivery 
access to businesses. While bus rapid transit systems generally increase the overall efficiency of 
urban transportation, implementation can nonetheless provoke resistance and backlash from 
these groups who see BRT as taking away a service or land use that they previously benefitted 
from. 
Policy Transfer & Diffusion 
Building on the discussion of technological innovation, a discussion of policy transfer is also 
important in addressing the widespread adaptation of bus rapid transit systems in cities around 
the world. Borrowing from Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer refers to the process in which 
“knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or 
place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in 
another time and/or place” (Marsden, G. & Stead, D., 2011, p. 493). Policy transfer can also be 
characterized as a form of learning between individuals and/or organizations, involving the 
“voluntary flow of ideas” and the “acquisition and utilization of knowledge about policies 
elsewhere” (Hoyt, L., 2006, p. 223). Several distinct terms fall under the umbrella concept of 
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policy transfer. As Evans & Davies note, “policy transfer is used as a generic concept which 
encompasses quite different claims about the nature of policy development” (1999, pp. 363-364). 
For example, sub-processes of policy transfer can include lesson drawing, policy diffusion, and 
policy convergence. Lesson drawing tends to be a “volantaristic” exercise, while policy diffusion 
and convergence depend on structural and institutional dynamics as well as technocratic 
determinism (Evans & Davies, 1999). 
Thus, policy transfer processes are influenced and determined by both the stakeholders 
involved and the underlying structure of the policy or problem in question. In reference to local 
environmental policy responses to ground water pollution, urban air pollution, and waste 
management, Tews et al note that “the global convergence of [local] environmental policies 
[can] be explained as a result of the international diffusion of ideas, approaches, institutions, and 
instruments in the field of environmental protection” (2003, p. 571). Three factors primarily 
influence the ‘diffusability’ or applicability of policy innovations: 
1. The underlying problem structure – e.g. how visible, and therefore politically salient, the 
problem in question may be; 
2. Compatibility – e.g. the extent to which innovations are compatible with existing 
technologies and institutions; and 
3. Political feasibility – e.g. the extent to which an innovation will generate conflict (Tews 
et al, 2003, pp. 577-578). 
Coordinated actors and social networks play an increasing role in this process as well. 
According to Hoyt, “policy transfer entrepreneurs”, including planners, policy makers, 
academics, and activists – representing both public and private organizations – create 
transnational information networks through which ideas and policies spread. Within the urban 
 20 
planning field, entrepreneurs have historically formed networks by visiting other cities, hosting 
tours and site visits, attending lectures, and/or participating in studios (Hoyt, L. 2006, p. 223). 
Increasingly, these networks are supported through the globalization of communications and 
advances in information and communications technology (Tews et al. 2003, p. 572). 
Referring specifically to transportation policy transfer, Marsden et al identify a number of 
actors that influence policy and technology transfer: elected officials, private suppliers and 
vendors, consultants, interest groups, and the general public (2011, pp. 506-507). Despite the 
diversity of actors, the transfer of innovative transportation policies is frequently a social process, 
“built around curiosity, exchange and trust” between city officials and transportation 
stakeholders, in which “informal networks and information sharing through professional 
networks [are] the predominant methods of initial knowledge transfer” (Marsden et al., 2011, p. 
511). In large part, this is due to an overabundance of publically available information, and 
questions over quality and bias with ‘best practice’ guides and other online resources, and the 
subsequent importance of utilizing trusted peer networks for applicable lessons and transferable 
policy innovations (Marsden et al, 2011, p. 511). Further highlighting the networked and multi-
perspective aspect of policy transfer, the majority of transport policy innovations reflect hybrid 
solutions that incorporate lessons and practices from multiple cities (Marsden et al, 2011, p. 510).  
Research Design 
Based on the discussion of technological innovation and policy transfer thus far, this study 
seeks to explore the institutional implications of bus rapid transit innovations and the processes 
through which new transportation technologies embed within local contexts. Given its growing 
popularity, I am interested in understanding the institutional implications of implementing BRT, 
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including the role of various actors and stakeholders, the process of adapting infrastructure, and 
the applicability of enabling policies and planning approaches. Furthermore, in light of the 
widespread adaptation of BRT, I am interested in understanding how different cities have 
addressed these institutional questions, and the lessons that planners, policy makers, and other 
stakeholders have drawn from cities that have implemented BRT. 
Of course, these are very big questions, many of which cannot be fully or even partially 
addressed within the scope of this Masters thesis. As such, I have opted to focus on two cities – 
Bogota, Colombia and Johannesburg, South Africa – and the experiences of those cities in 
adapting BRT to the existing transportation system, particularly with respect to loosely 
organized, semi-formal taxi and bus operators. While implementing bus rapid transit for different 
reasons, Bogota and Johannesburg encountered similar challenges in implementing BRT, thus 
providing a basis for comparison in understanding the role of institutional adaptation and 
development, and the process by which planners and policy makers engaged the various actors 
involved in BRT implementation. 
In addressing these questions, I have developed two frameworks to help explore the 
institutional implications of BRT implementation. The first is a comparative taxonomy of 
institutions and actors engaged in BRT, including system metrics, system management, key 
motivations for implementation, and the various actors responsible for BRT development, 
operations, and management.  Table 1 provides a full list of these variables. 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Institutions and Actors 
 
Case Study City: Bogota, Colombia Johannesburg, South Africa 
System Overview TransMilenio ReaVaya 
Year Implemented 2000 2009 
System Size 9 corridors; 65 routes; 150 km  1 corridor; 1 route; 25 km 




Low Transit share and 
growing private automobile 
use; fragmented network of 
informal bus operators 
Fragmented and chaotic 
network of mini-bus / taxi 
operators organized into loose 
confederations; lack of 
established route networks, 
schedules, or fare systems 
Government Role   
Local / City Mayor Enrique Penalosa 
prioritized public 
transportation improvements; 
City Council authorized 
establishment of TransMilenio 
S.A. public-private partnership 
structure 
City Government established 
public-private partnership 
structure responsible for 
planning, developing, 
operating and managing 
ReaVaya; controls 33% stake 
in ReaVaya parent company, 
PioTrans 




Key Motivations for 
Implementing 
Rapid growth in population, 
private automobile use, and 
associated congestion; need 
for enhanced, low-cost public 
transportation system as rail-
based metro system was cost 
prohibitive  
Highly fragmented and 
informal transportation 
services; need for enhanced 
public transportation service 
in preparation for 2010 FIFA 
World Cup  
Key Actors Responsible for 
Implementation 
Mayor, City Council City Government, City Taxi 
Unions 
System Management TransMilenio S.A., a public 
authority, oversees overall 
planning, management, and 
operations. Individual routes 
operated by private 
contractors under a public-
private partnership scheme 
PioTrans, a public-private 
partnership between the  
City of Johannesburg and Taxi 
Owners & Taxi Association 
members; Taxi union 
members control 66.7% of 
PioTrans, while the City of 
Johannesburg controls the rest 
Source: EMBARQ & ALC-BRT, 2012 
 
The second framework, represented by Table 2, builds off of the taxonomy of institutions and 
actors to express BRT implementation (the dependent variable) as a function of institutional 
planning (the independent variable). Analyzing and expressing BRT implementation in this way 
helps to frame the success or failure of technological innovation in terms of the adaptation of 
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underlying institutions, and when extended across cities can provide a basis of comparison in 
studying institutional approaches to BRT implementation. 
 
Table 2: Implementation Analysis 
 
City: Bogota Johannesburg 
Dependent Variable: 
BRT Implementation – 
e.g. degree of success 
Highly Successful; considered 
model BRT system 
Ongoing implementation; 
encountered initial problems that 
required modified management 
arrangement 
Independent Variables: 
Institutional Planning – 
e.g. how was BRT plan 
developed, negotiated; 
how did actors 
coordinate? 
• Strong leadership from Mayor 
Enrique Penalosa 
• TransMilenio developed as part 
of a bundle of transportation 
investments, including 
pedestrian and bicycle 
infrastructure improvements, 
roadway and automobile use 
restrictions 
• Existing taxi and bus operators 
were engaged from the start 
and incorporated into 
TransMilenio operating and 
management structure 
• Developed as part of overall 
transportation improvements in 
preparation for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup 
• ITDP consulted on various 
aspects of BRT system design, 
including incorporation of 
informal bus operators 
• Expedited implementation 
schedule required by World 
Cup prevented full integration 




Analysis of City Experiences 
Bogota 
TransMilenio - Bogota, Colombia’s bus rapid transit system – was initiated in 2000 utilizing  
“exclusive bus lanes, high capacity articulated buses, efficient private operation, advanced fare 
collection, and a new public authority for planning, developing, and controlling the system 
(Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, p. 37). Service was initiated with a capital investment of $2.3 billion 
to cover infrastructure construction costs, and funded through a 50% earmark on local gas tax 
revenues (Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, p. 44). In addition, the development of TransMilenio was 
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part of a bundle of transportation reforms: in addition to BRT, the city implemented an extended 
network of pedestrian and bicycle ways; peak hour automobile limitations using license plate 
restrictions, increased parking prices, and increased day-long automobile prohibitions (2002, p. 
38). Together, these features achieved quick success and led the Institute for Transportation and 
Development Policy (ITDP), a BRT advocacy and advisory NGO, to designate TransMilenio a 
“gold standard” of BRT (ITDP, 2011a). After less than two years of service, TransMilenio was 
transporting 650,000 passengers per day through 38 kilometers of exclusive busways and 62 
stations, with a route network totaling 125 kilometers (Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, p. 37). Today, 
the system carries 1.8 million passengers per day, representing 73.5% of regional commuters, 
over an exclusive bus corridor network spanning 87 kilometers (Embarq & ALC-BRT, 2012). 
In response to Bogota’s rapid population growth and increasing reliance on private 
automobile usage, and in response to the city’s low quality and disorganized public 
transportation services, Mayor Enrique Penalosa made transportation planning and investment a 
political priority, and initiated planning for a bus-based transit system in 1998. Prior to 
TransMilenio, Bogota’s transportation system was comprised of numerous private operators, 
utilizing old and inefficient vehicles. Bus operators often did not utilize designated bus stops, and 
would pick up and drop off riders anywhere along their routes. This, of course, contributed to 
slow speeds and congestion, and made for a low-quality public transportation system. 
Fragmented ownership and lack of route regulation also led to aggressive competition between 
bus drivers to pick up passengers, and contributed to unsafe traffic conditions. Lack of regulation 
also meant an overcapacity of buses relative to passenger demand, which also contributed to road 
congestion and aggressive competition for passengers. Thus in 1998, over 52,000 accidents and 
1,000 fatalities were recorded in Bogota. 
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In February 1999, Bogota’s City Council authorized the creation of a new transit authority to 
develop a BRT system. Eight months later, in October 1999, the city government and local 
agencies developed a charter establishing TransMilenio S.A. as the transit authority responsible 
for BRT planning, development, operations, and management. TransMilenio S.A. then initiated 
the bidding process for trunk line concessions in November 1999, and by April 2000, four 
separate companies, operating as a consortium of existing local transportation providers and 
national and international investors, were awarded contracts to initiate service (Sandoval & 
Hidalgo, 2002, pp. 42-44). 
One of Bogota’s key innovations was in the management of TransMilenio and the integration 
of existing transit providers. Comparable to Curitiba’s ITN, TransMilenio’s operations are 
contracted out to private companies based on conditions stipulated in concession agreements. 
According to Sandoval & Hidalgo, bus operators are selected through a competitive bidding 
process, and are responsible for staffing, bus fleet procurement, and operations and maintenance. 
As in the Curitiba model, TransMilenio operators are paid based on the number of kilometers 
they serve (2002, p. 41). The bid evaluation for bus operations considered “local experience in 
transit operations, environmental performance of buses, and cost per kilometer” of service, thus 
rewarding efficiency of operations (Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, p. 43). In addition to bus 
operators, fare collection is also contracted out, and daily fare collections are deposited into a 
trust fund used to pay various system contractors (Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, p. 41).  
 Importantly, Bogota’s planners recognized the role of pre-existing bus operators, and the 
resistance that operators might mount to their potential replacement and/or loss of livelihood 
through the implementation of TransMilenio. Thus, from early planning stages, existing bus 
service operators were incorporated into TransMilenio’s operations and service delivery 
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structure. As discussed above, the concession process factored in local transportation service 
experience, thus granting these operators a competitive advantage in bidding on TransMilenio 
bus routes. According to Sandoval & Hidalgo, this process was effective in securing the support 
of local transportation firms and smoothing the transition to TransMilenio: as a result of the 
concession process, 96% of the local transport companies (62 out of 66 transit companies) 
acquired stock in the four companies that were awarded with the trunk line concession contracts” 
(2002, p. 43). By structuring concession awards in this way, TransMilenio planners thus not only 
enabled the successful deployment of new technology for enhanced transportation service 
delivery, but also initiated an institutional framework that mitigated against the economically 
disruptive, and hence politically challenging aspects of technological innovation. This success 
has provided a valuable lesson for bus rapid transit planners in Johannesburg, South Africa, 
which the following section will discuss. 
Johannesburg 
In conjunction with its winning bid for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the South African 
national government made a commitment to improve the country’s public transportation services. 
In Johannesburg, the city government initiated planning for BRT in 2006 with the design of the 
78-station, 120 km Rea Vaya (“We Are Moving”) system. Service began in August 2009, with 
40 buses operating along the 25.5 km route between Soweto and Johannesburg Inner City, and is 
projected to be fully operational by 2013 (GTZ, 2010).  
Prior to Rea Vaya, Johannesburg’s transportation system was dominated by informally 
operated taxis and minibuses, which were often operated by unlicensed drivers with irregular 
schedules and unpublished fares. According to Weinstock (2009), informal mini-bus taxis were 
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the primary transportation mode for the 63% of city residents who do not own a car. This system 
relied on a complex and informal institutional framework. As Weinstock describes,  
The 15-seat minibuses operate without schedules waiting at taxi ranks until they are full 
to depart, so passengers never know how long a trip will take. Hailing the right minibus 
taxi requires knowledge of a complex array of hand signals. Most minibus taxis terminate 
in Johannesburg’s central business district (CBD), so passengers who need to travel 
beyond the CBD must transfer and pay a second fare. The taxis also travel at breakneck 
speeds, trying to capture passengers as quickly as possible (2009, p. 17). 
 
Because mini-buses are largely unregulated and are operated by overlapping and competing taxi 
owner associations, routes and fare systems are not integrated, requiring multiple transfers and 
payments for trips that do not begin or end in the central business district. 
Johannesburg’s informal mini-bus industry first emerged in the 1970s, when the City 
reduced public service and opened the public transport market to private operators. At the time, 
under apartheid rule, the mini-bus industry represented one of the few sectors that allowed black 
entrepreneurship, attracting numerous entrants and eventually ruthless competition. According to 
Weinstock, “shortly after the taxi industry’s emergence, driver associations were formed to 
protect individual routes. Violence, and a mafia mentality, took hold. Taxi organizations declared 
war on one another, resulting in driver and passenger deaths” (2009, p. 17). 
With the development of Rea Vaya, the mini-bus industry expressed strong resistance 
due to the inability of mini-bus operators to compete with BRT on speed, price, convenience, or 
security, risking lost revenue and potential unemployment (GTZ, 2010). When the City of 
Johannesburg first proposed Rea Vaya, the taxi industry protested, went on strike, and formed 
the United Taxi Association Forum as an anti-BRT association (Weinstock, 2010, 18). To 
address this conflict, the City sought to incorporate displaced taxi drivers directly into the 
planning and management for Rea Vaya. To plan, manage, and operate the system, the City of 
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Johannesburg implemented a public private partnership governance structure split between City 
Government and Taxi Owners and Taxi Association members. PioTrans, the company 
responsible for running Rea Vaya, has a long-term contract with the city to implement bus rapid 
transit; former taxi owners and taxi union members control 66.7% of the company, while the 
remaining shares are held by the City of Johannesburg. PioTrans’ board includes 13 former taxi 
operators, and the Director of Corporate Affairs previously served as chair of the Greater 
Johannesburg Regional Taxi Council (Jennings, 2011; Environmental News Services, 2011). 
As part of the concession and ownership agreement, the City of Johannesburg financed 
taxi driver ownership through a taxi recapitalization scheme in which taxi owners surrendered 
operating licenses and allowed their vehicles to be scrapped in exchange for shares of PioTrans. 
So far, over 500 taxi owners and drivers from over nine taxi associations have bought into Rea 
Vaya (Jennings, 2011). Generally, former taxi owners are employed as bus drivers, station 
attendants, or as community ambassadors for Rea Vaya. 
Johannesburg’s transition to BRT has not been seamless, despite proactive efforts to 
incorporate the minibus taxi industry. According to Weinstock, the taxi industry was not able to 
form an operating company in time for the system launch, and the City handed initial operations 
over to Metrobus, a public non-BRT bus company. In addition, non-incorporated minibus taxi 
owners continue to oppose and protest Rea Vaya, and have targeted taxi association members 
that have joined Rea Vaya with violence, in a few cases killing prominent pro-BRT association 
members (Weinstock, 2010, p. 18). However, by February 2011, the taxi association formally 
assumed control for ReaVaya (ITDP, 2011b). Moving forward, PioTrans and the City of 
Johannesburg can seek to further incorporate minibus taxi owners by developing integrated fare 
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Bogota and Johannesburg’s experiences implementing bus rapid transit highlight the 
importance of understanding actors and institutions when planning for technological innovation. 
In this context institutions include norms, rules, and contractual mechanisms, as discussed by 
North, as well as organizational forms, as advanced by Hodgson. Following North, property 
rights play a critical role in the proper functioning of a commercial transportation system, 
whether publicly or privately owned and operated. Under Johannesburg’s earlier informal mini-
bus taxi system, taxi owners lacked property rights such as set routes, service networks, queuing 
systems, or formal fare collection mechanisms providing greater access to fare-paying customers. 
As a result, to use North’s language, drivers were compelled to “cheat and shirk”, sometimes 
resorting to violence, and frequently leading to unsafe, inefficient, and costly service for taxi 
riders. By establishing “well-specified and well-enforced property rights”, whether through taxi 
licenses, route concessions, or a monopoly service in the case of TransMilenio or Rea Vaya, 
state-backed public transportation institutions serve to enhance service reliability, productivity, 
and efficiency, both for the service user and the service provider (North, 1987, pp. 420-421). 
Likewise, as Hodgson (2006) notes, institutions are “systems of established and embedded social 
rules that structure social interaction”, and include organizations to the extent that organizations 
dictate structure, control, and responsibility (Hodgson, 2006, p. 18). 
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In both Bogota and Johannesburg, TransMilenio S.A. and PioTrans, the respective BRT 
parent companies, serve an important institutional role in providing a public-private governance 
structure that facilitates cooperation between city government and transit operators in planning 
and managing bus rapid transit services. In Bogota, TransMilenio achieves this through a 
targeted concession process designed to encourage local transit providers to operate the system. 
PioTrans takes this arrangement a step further by enabling taxi owners to take an ownership 
stake in the system. Were it not for these institutional and organizational arrangements, both 
cities’ innovative urban transportation planning efforts would have met far more political 
resistance, and might have failed to get off the ground. 
While Rea Vaya is still in a development phase, early signs are promising, as the system 
attracted 17,000 riders per day in its first week of limited service alone (Weinstock, 2010, p. 18). 
By launching Rea Vaya on the right institutional footing, the City of Johannesburg has primed 
itself for future success, despite ongoing conflicts with anti-BRT taxi owners. As Stiglitz (1989) 
notes, institutions and social organization play an important role in growth potential. Differences 
in growth and performance “can be attributed to differences in organization, to how individuals 
interact, and to the institutions which mediate those interactions” (Stiglitz, 1989, p. 197). Thus, 
for urban transportation planning in cities such as Johannesburg or elsewhere in the developing 
world, the issue is as much institutional as it is physical or technological. While technologies 
exist to improve the performance of urban transportation systems, the key to successful planning 
and policy ultimately lays in institutional development. In the case of both TransMilenio and Rea 
Vaya, this entailed an institutional framework for property rights allocation and conflict 
resolution. For urban transportation innovations more generically, this could also include the 
development of traffic and safety regulations, general acceptance and adherence to these 
 31 
regulations as social norms, and the organizational capacity to plan, finance, and implement 
transportation services. 
Policy Diffusion 
Returning to the earlier discussion of policy diffusion, social learning and networks of 
information exchange have also played an important role in the diffusion and adaptation of bus 
rapid transit. Throughout TransMilenio’s planning stages, obtaining information about BRT 
systems in other cities was “a very important factor of the process” (Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, 
p. 42). During this period, TransMilenio planners visited Quito, Ecuador; Curitiba, Sao Paulo, 
and Goiania, Brazil; Santiago, Chile; and Mexico City and Puebla, Mexico to “identify key 
elements for system design” (Sandoval & Hidalgo, 2002, p. 42). Likewise, officials from Bogota 
have since gone on to share their experiences and expertise with other cities seeking to 
implement bus rapid transit. According to Matsumoto (2007), planners and policy makers from 
Jakarta, Indonesia; Seoul, South Korea; and Beijing, China drew lessons from Bogota’s “best 
practice” examples and organized official exchanges to experience and learn from TransMilenio 
firsthand. Highlighting the importance of informal networks and personal connections in the 
policy learning process, Sutiyoso, the Governor of Jakarta who led BRT implementation, was 
heavily influenced by Enrique Penalosa, the former Mayor of Bogota responsible for 
implementing TransMilenio. In particular, Sutiyoso made BRT implementation a key component 
of his winning 2001 re-election campaign, and drew lessons from Bogota on the specification of 
bus lanes, stations, vehicles, and fare collection systems (Matsumoto, 2007).  
Technological Innovation 
The discussion of bus rapid transit thus far highlights several important implications for 
technological innovation more broadly. To be successful, BRT innovations have needed to be 
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flexible and adaptable, combining infrastructure enhancements with operational and managerial 
improvements. According to Kost & Nohn 
Treating BRT only as a road infrastructure improvement leads to low capacity and poor 
system quality. Besides good physical design, successful implementation of BRT requires 
system management, operations planning, a dedicated BRT bus fleet with easy boarding 
and alighting, and sound placement of stations (2011, p. 14). 
 
As demonstrated by Curitiba, Bogota, and Johannesburg, this is a comprehensive effort, often 
requiring staged implementation, changes in institutional structure, and coordinated 
transportation policies. Though a potentially monumental task, this process should not be pre-
determined, but rather pursued incrementally. As Cervero points out, Curitiba’s city leaders did 
not start out with a preconceived idea of a transportation solution when developing ITN, but 
instead “asked what would be the most cost-effective transport investments consistent with 
building a linear city as well as the goals of preserving the inner core, improving environmental 
quality, and keeping costs reasonable” (1996, p. 292). As the former Mayor of Curitiba, Cassio 
Taniguchi points out, “we are constantly innovating, with creativity. The system [ITN] is not 
exhausted. We have developed new projects incrementally, new changes to make it better. This 
has occurred in the past and occurs through the present” (Demery, 2004, p. 35-36). 
 
While bi-lateral exchanges and informal learning networks have played an important role in 
the diffusion of BRT systems, this process has not always led to success. According to 
Weinstock et al, the “lack of a common understanding of what constitutes a BRT system has led 
to branding problems. The lack of any sort of quality control on bus-based mass transit 
interventions has made it possible for marginal bus system improvements to be branded as BRT, 
leading to some community backlash against the concept of BRT” (2011, p. 6). For example, 
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several cities in Brazil, Indonesia, China, and India have incorporated “sub-optimal bus system 
improvements [that] were branded as BRT” after gaining some familiarity with well-known BRT 
systems, such as Bogota’s TransMilenio or Jakarta’s TransJakarta (Weinstock et al., 2011, p. 6). 
To address this issue, ITDP is developing a BRT Standard metrics system to uphold the design 
and quality standards of bus rapid transit and assist planners and policy makers in implementing 
BRT. This standard will rate BRT systems through a weighted scoring of several indicators 
across 5 categories: service planning; infrastructure; station design and station-bus interference; 
quality of service and passenger information systems; integration and access (Weinstock et al., 
2011, p. 17). In so doing, ITDP will help to bridge the gap between formal and informal learning 
processes, and will supplement valuable social learning exchanges with high quality best practice 
resources that are readily at the disposal of planners and policy makers interested in 
implementing bus rapid transit. 
The Role of Planners 
Finally, Bogota and Johannesburg’s experiences with BRT offer several lessons for 
planning theory and discussions on the role of planners in supporting technological innovation. 
Though not exactly “insurgent”, planning for Bogota and Rea Vaya reflects Miraftab’s notion of 
critical and contextualized planning. Specifically, planners in both cities recognized “the power 
struggle within which [transportation planning] is practiced” by actively and deliberately 
engaging mini-bus taxi owners in both the planning process and the organizational structure 
(2009, p. 43). For the PioTrans case in particular, radical planning’s emphasis on inclusion and 
participation is important given the legacy of apartheid in South Africa, and the role of the mini-
bus taxi industry in supporting middle-class black entrepreneurs under apartheid. In the post-
apartheid era, the political, economic, and symbolic importance of supporting and maintaining 
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this group was surely apparent to planners and policy makers, even if the explicit goals of Rea 
Vaya were to fundamentally reformulate the transportation sector and its relationship to both 
society and the state. 
Likewise, the TransMilenio and Rea Vaya cases validate Sanyal’s emphasis on 
“anticipatory” public sector planning, which entails “an awareness of institutional constraints” 
and the anticipation of “institutional resistance to reform efforts” (2005, pp. 227-228). As Sanyal 
notes, “a key objective of innovative planning is to create new and ‘alternative’ institutional 
mechanisms in contradistinction with mainstream bureaucratic institutions” (2005, p. 237). 
TransMilenio and PioTrans’ innovative governance structures, utilizing public private 
partnerships between city government and local transit companies are surely cases in point. 
Finally, this analysis of BRT implementation, and of technological innovation more 
generally, underscores the importance of smart planning, political savvy, and a strong 
institutional basis within the state. The introduction of new technology and management systems, 
such as BRT, risks the type of international knowledge transfer failures identified by Banerjee in 
the post-colonial Indian context, in which innovations failed to diffuse because they did not 
correspond to local capabilities and institutional structures. As Banerjee notes, the inability of 
planners to “anticipate and negotiate local institutional traditions and to build broader support 
among the public and local civil society” undermines the implementation of plans and the 
diffusion of innovations” (2009, p. 206). Negotiating these questions is a critical component of 
technological innovation, and is thus a fundamental responsibility of planners in pursuing BRT 
or any other technological innovation. 
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Limitations & Areas of Future Research 
This study has sought to clarify the role of institutions and the relationships between 
actors in implementing bus rapid transit, but in doing so has prompted as many questions as it 
answers. Likewise, several questions simply fall outside the scope of this project, despite having 
incredible importance to the discussion of BRT implementation and the diffusion of 
technological innovations. For example, I have focused on the relationships between city 
planners and policy makers and existing transit providers, and the institutional arrangements 
deployed to mitigate conflict between these two groups. Thus far unaddressed, and therefore in 
need of future clarification, are the roles of the many additional stakeholders engaged in BRT 
implementation. These include international donors, such as the World Bank, advocacy and 
capacity building NGOs, such as EMBARQ and ITDP, and private-sector actors, such as bus 
manufactures and transportation consulting firms that may have an interest in and/or influence 
over the spread of Bus Rapid Transit. Understanding the role of these actors, in addition to the 
experience of cities not discussed in this study, is an important area for future research. Likewise, 
the sheer number of cities that have implemented bus rapid transit provides a wealth of 
additional data and potential lessons relating to questions of technological innovation. While 
Bogota has experienced tremendous success with TransMilenio, and Johannesburg shows early 
signs of promise with ReaVaya, other cities have had vastly difference experiences, both 
successful and unsuccessful. A full understanding of the institutional implications of BRT 
implementation cannot be understood using such a small sample of cities; moving forward, the 
experience of additional cities should be addressed. 
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Conclusion 
As an alternative to rail-based mass transit systems, bus rapid transit represents an 
important technological innovation that has quickly gained popularity as an adaptable and cost-
effective means of providing high quality urban mobility. While the technological aspects of 
BRT implementation are well understood, the role of actors, institutions, and planning processes 
has garnered less attention.  Focusing on the experiences of Bogota, Colombia and Johannesburg, 
South Africa, this study has sought to explore the institutional implications of BRT 
implementation by examining the role of different actors and enabling policies in facilitating 
technological innovation. Specifically, I have focused attention on the processes by which 
existing transit service providers are incorporated into new BRT systems, and the lessons that 
planners and policy makers have drawn from other cities while embarking on this process. Like 
other technological innovations, BRT offers many potential benefits. Nonetheless, several 
challenges and potential conflicts can threaten the success of BRT, including political backlash 
to the “creative destruction” wrought by innovation, and failures on behalf of planners and policy 
makers to consider pre-existing transportation services and institutional arrangements. 
Against this backdrop, Bogota and Johannesburg’s experiences implementing Bus Rapid 
Transit offer a number of valuable lessons in planning for technological innovation in urban 
transportation. These include the development of appropriate institutional mechanisms for 
defining transportation-related property rights, facilitating the inclusion of existing transit 
providers, and managing conflict resolution. Of course, as part of the broader effort to support a 
sustainable and equitable urban transportation paradigm, planners must consider many additional 
factors beyond service integration. These include the adaptation of physical infrastructure and 
urban design, identification of equitable pricing and fare levels, coordinated land use planning 
 37 
and transportation demand management, amongst other considerations. With respect to actors 
and institutions, this also includes the role of actors outside the scope of this study, including 
consultants, vendors and equipment manufacturers, NGOs, advocacy groups, and policy 
networks. Nonetheless, by beginning to explore these dynamics, and developing a basis of 
institutional comparison between cities implementing BRT, I have sought to shed light on the 
processes of innovation and diffusion, so that planners, policy makers, and other stakeholders 
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Appendix 1: List of BRT Cities 
	  
City Country Year 
Curitiba Brazil 1974 
Belo Horizonte Brazil 1975 
Goiania Brazil 1976 
Porto Alegre Brazil 1977 
Pittsburgh United States 1977 
São Paulo Brazil 1980 
Recife Brazil 1982 
Ottawa Canada 1983 
Campinas Brazil 1986 
Adelaide Australia 1986 
Campo Grande Brazil 1987 
Mauá - Diadema Brazil 1988 
Paris France 1993 
Ipswich United Kingdom 1994 
Leeds United Kingdom 1995 
Quito Ecuador 1995 
Oberhausen Germany 1996 
Jonkoping Sweden 1996 
Criciúma Brazil 1996 
Vancouver Canada 1996 
Dublin Ireland 1997 
Miami United States 1997 
Orlando United States 1997 
Taipei Taiwan 1998 
Juiz de Fora Brazil 1998 
Kunming China 1999 
Joinville Brazil 1999 
Twente Netherlands 2000 
Bogotá Colombia 2000 
Nagoya Japan 2001 
Nancy France 2001 
Rouen France 2001 
Utrecht Netherlands 2001 
Brisbane Australia 2001 
Caen France 2002 
Amsterdam Netherlands 2002 
Bradford United Kingdom 2002 
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Boston United States 2002 
Prato Italy 2003 
Eindhoven Netherlands 2003 
Gothenburg Sweden 2003 
Crawley United Kingdom 2003 
León de los Aldama Mexico 2003 
Oakland United States 2003 
Melbourne Australia 2003 
Sydney Parramatta/Rouse Hill Australia 2003 
Sydney, Blacktown /Rouse Hill Australia 2003 
Sydney, Liverpool /Parramatta Australia 2003 
Beijing China 2004 
Jakarta Indonesia 2004 
Seoul Republic of Korea 2004 
Edinburgh United Kingdom 2004 
Las Vegas United States 2004 
Hamburg Germany 2005 
Olinda Brazil 2005 
Mexico City Mexico 2005 
Monterrey Mexico 2005 
Halifax Canada 2005 
York Regional Municipality Canada 2005 
Kansas City United States 2005 
Los Angeles United States 2005 
Auckland New Zealand 2005 
Hangzhou China 2006 
Pune India 2006 
Douai France 2006 
Lyon France 2006 
Nantes France 2006 
Brescia Italy 2006 
Kent United Kingdom 2006 
Luton United Kingdom 2006 
York United Kingdom 2006 
Uberlândia Brazil 2006 
Santiago Chile 2006 
Pereira Colombia 2006 
Guayaquil Ecuador 2006 
Tehran Iran 2007 
Istanbul Turkey 2007 
City Country Year 
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Lorient France 2007 
Guatemala Guatemala 2007 
Merida Venezuela 2007 
Eugene United States 2007 
Lagos Nigeria 2008 
Changzhou China 2008 
Chongqing China 2008 
Dalian China 2008 
Jinan China 2008 
Xiamen China 2008 
New Delhi India 2008 
Lille France 2008 
Maubeuge France 2008 
Toulouse France 2008 
Natal Brazil 2008 
Cali Colombia 2008 
New York United States 2008 
Phoenix United States 2008 
Johannesburg South Africa 2009 
Zhengzhou China 2009 
Ahmedabad India 2009 
La Rochelle France 2009 
Cambridge United Kingdom 2009 
Swansea United Kingdom 2009 
Santos Brazil 2009 
Guadalajara Mexico 2009 
Cleveland United States 2009 
Snohomish County United States 2009 
Guangzhou China 2010 
Hefei China 2010 
Yancheng China 2010 
Zaozhuang China 2010 
Jaipur India 2010 
Bangkok Thailand 2010 
London United Kingdom 2010 
Diadema - São Paulo Brazil 2010 
João Pessoa Brazil 2010 
Londrina Brazil 2010 
Maceió Brazil 2010 
Niteroi Brazil 2010 
Sumaré Brazil 2010 
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Barranquilla Colombia 2010 
Bucaramanga Colombia 2010 
Ecatepec Mexico 2010 
Lima Peru 2010 
Brampton Canada 2010 
Cape Town South Africa 2011 
Buenos Aires Argentina 2011 
Blumenau Brazil 2011 
Brasília Brazil 2011 
Rio de Janeiro Brazil 2011 
Medellín Colombia 2011 
Panama Panama 2011 
Winnipeg Canada 2012 
 
Source: EMBARQ & Across Latitudes and Cultures – Bus Rapid Transit (ALC-BRT). (2012). 
Global BRT Data. Retrieved from http://brtdata.org 
	  
